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Chapter I
Introduction: Origin of the Right of Angary
In a famous passage in the "Social Contract," Rousseau wrote:
"War is not a relation of man to man, hut state to state, in
which individuals are enemies only accidentally, not as men nor
even as citizens, but as soldiers, not as members of their country
but as its defenders,"^ It is on this basic idea that the modern
law of a war rests. Yet it is easy to point out the crudeness and
certain contusion mind vhich this passage shows. "Par a state
consists only of individual citizens and when one state attacks
another, the individuals of the one must attack the individuals of
the other. It is impossible actually to realize this ideal. The
armies cannot fight except upon the soil and property of the state;
even privately owned lands must become the scene of war operations.
Moreover, it is not unnatural for a belligerent to endeavor to pro-
vide for the objects which he needs urgently for waging war or for
maintaining his troops, but v/hich he has not on hand, in the local-
ity where he is just then stationed. Such action is. recognized by
the Hague Congerences to the effect that in enemy territory the
belligerent may, through requisitions procure from private indivi-
duals those objects which he needs for his army.
Such requistions affect especially the nationals of the enemy
state. It may be questioned whether they affect also the nationals
of neutral states. According to the general principle of inter-
national law, neutrals may not be treated as enemies in the course
of war. This being true, it might be asserted that even private
neutral property could not be subject to requisitions for the
1, Bentwich, War and Private Property, pall
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reason that the neutrality of the owner would be violated. But it
is not impossible that a belligerent under military necessity, may
resort to the right of requisitioning even private neutral property
which is found to be accidentally in its own territory or in the
territory of the enemy. This is known as the right of angary which
is traceable even to early Roman times, though, for a time, it came
to change its original meaning.
As regards the right of requisitioning private neutral pro-
perty distinction must be made between property continuously or
temporarily situated in the territory of a belligerent itself or in
occupied enemy territory. What rules govern these two cases? And
what rules govern the requisitioning of private neutral ships in
territorial waters or on the open sea? If"military necessity" is
maintained on the part of the belligerent, what would be the scope
of the term, and what would be his liability in exercising the rights
It is the object of this study to ascertain and set forth whether
or not and to what extent the right of angary is justifiable accord-
ing to the accepted law of nations. Before going any further a
sketch of the historical basis for the right of angary throws much
light on the right as is understood today.
Origin of The Right of Angary
The development and evolution of ius angariae in internation-
al law are connected with certain legal principles that were estab-
lished in Rome with regard to the right of dealing in grain. Ac-
cording to Roman Law, all owners of ships, in c-.se of necessity,
were subject to the obligation to place their ships at *he disposal
of the public authority to facilitate the importation of grain. It
cannot be ascertained from the sources that private ships could be
seized for the military transportation service. There was a special
organized guild called the CorT3us Navi culari orum which attended to
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the transportation. The c.'se of necessity, when privr^te ships
could also he compelled to perfom such service, arose, only when
the guild was unahle to neet the situation, either for v/ant of
ships, or because at a given moment puhlic ships for the transpor-
tation of grain were not available. Services accepted from private
ships in these circumstan'";es were not called angari ae by the Ro-
2
iTians. An .^ariae is a low I,atin word implying forced servioe;it
comes from the G-reek word (taken from Persian) meaning a messeneer
in ancient Persia liahle to impressment in the royal service, in
the Corpus Juris, i\ngariae refer rather to statute labor with
teams, compulsory furnishing of teams for the transportation of
things and persons in affairs of the state. In the latin language
wagons were also designated by that sam.e term, th at is to say,
wagons used for the transportation of fi9ca.l goods or a.ccorpanying
the arms for t^" e accom.mo dation of the sick. And, finally, angari a e
denoted also draft animals that were provided for such purposes by
the ov/ners of land by reason of an easem.ent on such land. Vrom
this it appears that angari ae in P.om.an Lav; did not belong to mar-
itime law, but to that which might be called the law of postal ad-
ministration. In the Roman Law, we mieet, to be sure, with legal
principles referring to th'^ perform^ance of transports intended for
the supply of the necessaries of life, and especially of P.om.e.
Furtherm.ore , these legal principles are not of an international
4
nature, but referred merely to domestic affairs. " Angari a
e
" was
used in the I'^iddle Ages in reference to certain feudal burdens, ^.r^
find angariae (to com.pel) in the Vulgate; and in the Digest it
5
means to exact velleinage.
^
2. Memorandum of Authorities on the Law of Angary
, pp . 25-26
3. American Law Review, vol. 5?
,
p. 452
4. Memorandum of Authorities on the Law of Angary, p. 26-29
5. American Law Review, vol. 52, p. 452

After the nev/ parts of the world had been discovered and a
lively rivalry had arisen between the V/estern "i'uropean States for
the possession of colonies, it became especially important for the
interested powers to secure ocean-faring ships. These were used for
the outfitting of expeditions, for the discovery of new territories
or for waging war against competing powers. As international re-
lations became more complex, the right of angary came to be applied
to ships. Writers sought to explain the practice of the siezure of
ships for the service of a state on the basis of t}ie Roman Law,
Huch attempts ^ were not of great scientific value; they were full of
m.i sGoncep tions of the principles of Roman Law. But as in all other
cases, upon accepting the Torinciples of Rom.an Law, it was not the
purpose to grasp and interpret them in the only way in which they
were expected to be grasped and interpreted, but for the needs of
the occasion ti e foreign term had to be adapted to them.
Under the term ius angariae
.
many writers on international law
place the right which was often claimed and practiced in the later
period, of a belligerent deficient in vessels to lay an embargo on
and to seize neutral merchant men in his harbors, and to com.pel
them and their crews to transport troops, aram-unition, and provisions
to certain places on payment of freight in advance. This practice
• ^ 6
was frequently resorted to by Louis XIV of "France.
The validity of this practice was clearly recognized both by
the civil law and common law, "^y the civil law, according to the
"Black Boo k of the Admiral ty"a Ving was justified in pressing into
service, or seizing ships of every description and of every nation
whi c^h might be found in his ports, for purposes of urgent necessity
but
,
^
nev er thelesSj a taci t
___
cpndi tipn p f, , sj^f e_ re turn was^ ann exed to
, OPPenheim, International Law, vol ,,p.394
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such seizure or impressnent . By the Ancient Law of England, the
Admiral might arrest any ships for the Kings service, and after he
had made a return of the arrest in chancery, the owner of the ships
could not plead against such return.
It is also evident f ron the ancient writs and patents of 'Eng-
land that the Admiral, the Wardens of the Cinque Ports, and others,
were aut-norized to seize ships of war and other vessels, to impress
seamen, and to camraandeer provisions and arms for purposes of
8
national defense. The exercise of the right apparently was not
limited to '^^Inglish ships only,By way of partial satisfaction to the
neutral, it was customary for the helli/^erent to nay freight for such
9
service in advance. The exercise of this right hecfame so vexatious
to neutrals that a series of treaties were drawn up attempting to
aholish it, "?or a time the right seemed to he ohsolete. The close
of the 18th century witnessed the revival of the righ, t, when
-^apoleon again called the practice into nlay. Since then the right
has been more cominonly applied and adopted by many treaties, and the
exercise of this right was no longer hased on royal prerogative, hut
rather on em.inent domain or territorial sovereignty. Thus from the
viev; points of its origin, the word angariae pertained to postal ad-
mini stration , and had nothing to do v;i th maritim.e law, and it gradu -
10
ally came to apply more and more to ships. However it should he re
_
memhered that the term ••angariae"is always applied hoth to requisi-
tion on land as well as in territorial waters.
7, Halleck' s International Law , vl
.
p . 520
8, Ihid ,p.550
9. Oppenheim. In ternational Law vl.P p. 394
10. Am. Jour. Int. Law, vl.l3 p.268(April 1919)

7Chapter II
Requisition of Private Property in General.
As regards the requisition of private neutral property, four
cases should he examined in accordance with the accepted rules of
nations, heca^use in time of war, neutral property may he found
either in the territory of the helligerent state or within its
territorial waters, such as rivers, harbors, ports and sea; in
occupied territory, or on the open sea. The requisition of proper-
ty in each of these cases meets with different viev. points, and
the historical development of tho rules governing them is likewise
different. The cases of requisition within the territory of a hel-
ligerent state and its territorial waters, as a matter of fact,
should he ^^rrouped into one, hecause in both cases territorial jur-
isdiction is usually and similarly maintained, in case of necessity
on the part of the helligerent, !Rut tVe exe-^cise of the right of
angary in territorial waters may involve the question of maritime
law and the objects to be requisitioned are different from those
requisitioned on land. Therefore the two cases will be treated
under different categories. On the other hand, requisition on land
naturally falls into two categories: nam.ely, requisition in the
territory of the belligerent state and requisition in an occupied
enemy territory. Again a distinction should he made in the latter
case between military occupation and conquest.
1. Requisition of neutral property in the territory of a bel-
ligerent state,
SO far as the Hague Regua.tions are concerned, the
19th article of the fifth convention recognizes the right of
angary in allowing a belligerent to utilize, in case of necessity.
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railways belonging to neutrals, subject to the payment of compen-
sation. But the article relating to the so-called right of angary
deals only with the use by a belligerent of neutral railway material
As a supplement to this written provision, the following customary
rule of international law may be given: "Property of neutrals of
other kinds found in territory which is the scene of hostilities,
is liable to be taken possession of or even destroyed for stratagic
reasons by either belligerent, but compensation must in this case,
be made by the belligerent so acting to the neutral owners for the
lass they have sustained."^
Article 19 of the Hague Convention^ provides: "Railway pro-
perty coming from the territory of neutral states whether it be-
longs to these states or companies or to private persons, and dis-
tinguishable as such, cannot be requisitioned or utilized by a
belligerent except in such cases and in such manner as dictated
by absolute necessity, such property shall be returned to its
country of origin as soon as possible."
Similarly, the neutral state can in case o-f necessity, keep
and utilize to an equil extent property coming from the territory
of a belligerent state.
An indemnity shall be paid proportionate to the amount of the
2property utilized and the character of utilization,"
The new provison added to the 19th article of the Hague
Regulations is very interesting and important, because it empowers
the neutral from whose territory the requisitioned railway plant
has come to supply its place for the time with railway plant which
has come into its territory from that of the belligerent power
1. Holland, Law and Custom of War on Land, p.
9
2, Scott, The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899
and 1907, p. 137

which authorized the requisition. Up to that time the right of
angary was supposed to be exercised only hy the "belligerent state.
And since the existence of this provision, a neutral country, dur-
ing the great European War, had resorted to this right. The import-
ance of the provision is that it has a douhle ohject; first, to pre-
vent a neutral state from having its own railway service disorgan-
ized "by the loss of its rolling stock; secondly, to provide an au-
tomatic discouragement, as it were, to the practice of seizing neu-
tral material which a belligerent might be inclined to resort to if
the material so obtained becomes a clear additionto his resources.
The provisions set forth by the article constitute a valuable re-
straint upon unscrupulous belligerents. Tlie seizure by the neutral
is not a measure of reprisal; and it must be resorted to irapartial-
3
ly and not in such a way as to favor a particular belligerent.
We shall have to consider the legal status of such neutral
property whose owners have no domicile within the territory of the
belligerent state, nor reside there in, and therefore, of property
which is merely in transit or has momentarily come into the
country of the belligerent. There are many treaties of the 19th
century which provide that the nationals of one of the contracting
parties may be subject to no requisitions within the territory of
the other party etc; it is, therefore, presumed that the owners
of the foreign state can be reached, that they dwell within the
territory of the respective state. But it is nowhere stated that
the property of the nationals of one of the contracting parties
remains free to this or to that extent from requisitions within the
territory of the other party. This latter conception would inclmde
all cases in which it would be possible for a state to requisition
3, Spaight, War Rights on Land, pp . 512-513
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neutral property.
According to the law of War, a neutral su'b.iect domiciled in
an eneny country acquires an enemy character, which extends to his
property; and apart from domicile, neutral property raay acquire
such a character hy "being locally situated in the enemy's country.
Such neutral persons or property are, therefore, sub.iect to all the
consequences of lawful hostilities, loss or injury by horahardment
,
the pa.yTnent of contributions, and the like. But neutral property
only temporarily situated in the enemy country acquires no hostile
character, and though the belligerents needs may justify his seiz-
5
ing or making use of it, the neutral is entitled to compensation.
The general principle that neutral property in belligerent
territory shares the liabilities of property belonging to subjects
of the state is clear and indisputable; and no objection can be
made to its effect upon property which is located either permanen-
tly or for a considerable time within the belligerent territory.
But it might perhaps have been expected, and it might certainly
have been hoped, that its application would not have been extended
to neutral property only temporarily v/ithin a belligerent state,
^-ut V':e right of angary is not necessarily confined to such pro-
perty of subjects of neutral state as retains its neutral charact-
er from its temporary position on belligerent territory.
'.Ve have Just been considering the legal status of private neu-
tral property with reference to the right of angary. As to the
scope of the right, only the seizure of railway material b longing
to neutrals is now regul^ited by convention. But is the right in
question only confined to railway material?In fact all sorts of
private neutral property, whether it consists of vessels
or other
means o f transport, or arms, amunition, provis i
ons or other persor^
4. Femorandum of Authorities on The Law of Angary p. 15
5. J,S.Risley,The Law of Y^ar,p,139

property, may "be the object of the'right of angary, provided the
articles concerned are servicilDle to military ends and wants. As
to the position of property, so far as it is within territorial
limits, there is no difference in principle, it is submitted, "be-
tween the rules which should govern the requisition of instruments
of co>-nmerce on land and in port. The two cases are cle-.rly analog-
ous. The 19th article of the Convention is by necessary implication
equally adaptable to transportation by sea. To lay down any other
rule would discriminate against sea powers. It would confer upon a
powerful inland state with excellent railroad communication, an
effective control over neutral means of communication, while simi-
lar powers would be denied to its enemies who were forced to rely
upon naval forces and instrumentalities for purposes of communica-
tion. It would be singular indeed if the right of angary in respect
to ships should be abrogated at the very m.oment when the correspon-
ing right of requisition of rolling stock on land was receiving
7
full recognition.
This question may be asked: Is the exercise of the right of
angary a use of belligerent power, an exercise of a sovereign right
or prerogative, or an application of the principle of eminent domain
or territorial sovereignty? Up to the time of the second Fague Con-
ference in 1907, the idea that a neutral as well as a belligerent
might exercise the right of angary had not been put forward, and
the right exercised was rather based on prerogative. The way in
which it was suggested was by the seizure of some Swiss rolling
stock by the Germans in 1870. The hardship worked upon the Swiss at
that time inspired the delegates at the 1907 Peace Conference to
adopt the 19th article of Convention V in v>hich we find the neutral
given the same right as the belligerent, based on the similar right
o^penheim, International Law, p. 39
5
7 . Minni so ta Law Review, vol .S ."o. 421
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of eminent domain. In fact, sinoe the conference of 1907 at The
Hague there has been a tendency to regard the right as one based on
territorial sovereignty or eminent domain rather than a prero.-^ative
8
of sovereignty. As Hall puts it, "the true basis of the right of
9
angary, is to be found in the principle of territorial sovereignty.
The law of every state is supreme over both persons and property
within the local jurisdiction,
2. Requisition of private neutral property within occur)ied enemy
terri tory
.
A careful distinction between occupation and conquest is one
of the great improvements in the law of Tiodern warfare. It prevents
the premature disturbance of property and legal relations which
resulted from the old conception thatthe invader had conquered the
territory as soon as h^was in occupation of it. Today conquest
does not result until there has been the complete subjugation or
extinction of one of tl'ie belligerents. A treaty may not always be
necessary to perfect the condition. Until this occurs, there is
only occupation. A territory is held to be occupied when it is, as
a matter of fact, under the authority of the hostile army which
has exclusive possession. Seizure in war does not give the bel-
ligerent any general right of possession to the property of his
enemy, but only a right of use based on the grounds of necessity
and self-preservation, and it extends only to things, Mfriich are in
defacto possession. In this way it is radically different from
conquest, which does provide a jural right of possession, so that
an occupant who becomes a conqueror succeeds to the incorrporeal
assets of the dispossessed sovereign. Property divested by an occu-
pant in excess of his rights returns to the orig;inal owner, sn fn.r
8. American Journal International Law, April 1919, p. ?84
9. Hall International Law, p. 743
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as possi'hle, upon the restoration of the old sovereign power, hy
the so-called law of po stlimini urn . This is a sort of international
equity which considers as not done, what should not have heen done.
Land war has very serious effects upon the private property
of enemies and neutrals vvliich is situated permanently, in the
territory of the "belligerent. On land the property of neutral is
not treated differently from that of enemies nor has the neutral
any more legal right to comT3ensation for damage done incidentally,
for it is not the character of the owner hut the location of the
property which- is decisive. Even when the property of domiciled
neutrals is taken possession -of or destroyed for stratagic reasons
hy either belligerent, compensation need not he paid to the owners
for the loss they have sustained. T^ut the property of the neutrals
temporarily in the country when seized is such circumstances, is
entilted to com.pensation. The injuries, however, caused hy the
events of war, hattle , seizuresjind homhardments , -these are con-
sidered as due to necessity and force (measure), and akin to loss-
es caused hy acts of G^od; , storms, earthquakes etc; and neither
belligerent considers himself required to compensate the private
owners affected. Legally domiciled neutrals have not better legal
rights from th? conqueror than enemies. For the purposes of war
and conquest rights depend, in the main, upon domicile. The dom-
icile of the neutral makes him liable to the same conditions as
the hostile subjects and the conqueror will only recognizd towards
him t'-e same liabilities as he recognizes towards any other in-
11habitants.
10. :^entwich ,War and Private Property p. 40
11. Ibid. p. 73

With regard to the requisition of things and services, an invader
rarely has rauch time for drawing distinctions, hut if he had the
time, he would prohahly choose to take what he wanted from enemy
rather than from neutral suhjects, without prejudice to his right
to take it from the latter in case of need and without incurring
greater liability than he would incur to^vards the former. There are
chances wliich neutral individuals and companies residing or carry-
ing on business in foreign country must run, for themselves and
for all property which they possess in that country in connection
with such residence or business, whether the residence amounts to
domicile or not. They increase the strength and wealth of that
country and to Torotect them, against the consequences of an invas-
12
ion of it would he an intolerable task for their own governments.
They may, however, be better situated than the conquered subjects
as regards their remedy, in as much as any grievance which they
urge can be backed up by their own governments, whereas the others
must depend only upon the grace of the conqueror. The experience
of the Transvaal annexation, indeed, seems to show that special
favor may be extended to nei'tral corporations as regards the con-
tracted rights of simi -public character. It is true that the Trans-
vaal commissions held that the property of the neutral shareholders
in the "Tetherlands f-outh African Railway 1o . had been legally for-
feited by the unneutral service of the companies' director in the
Transvaal. But this was an extreme case of identification with the
13
enemy which could not be excused.
The Scime reasons do not apply to property which may enter a
territory in the course of a business carried on elsewhere, and
which i n the same course would soon 3eave it again. Such is the
12. Westlake International Law vol. 2 p. 117
13. Bentwich
^
.War and Private Property
,
p. 73
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rolling stock of a foreign state or railway company which cannot
avoid crossing and recrossing the frontier fro^. time to tirr.e.
TDven in such case the neutral owner has in some measure entrust-
ed his property to the fortunes of the enemy, though not so far
as to identify it with him, and the just course i s to allow it
to he requisitioned for a real military necessity, with compensa
-
14
tion.
Articles 52 and 53 of the 4th Convention of 1907 permit a
belligerent in military occupied territory to demand requisitions
in kind or payment in money, and to take possession of all means
of transport or other private property, subject to restoration at
the conclusion of "oeace. Such obligation being imT)osed on a "-ili -
tary occupant of enemy territory in regard to private enemy pro-
perty. We may regard it, in principle, as aioplying a fortiori in
case of neutral pronerty temToorarily or accidentally situated in
15
belligerent territory. If the iram.unity of private enemy properly is
recognized, that of r^rivate neutral property m.ust be consistently
recognized also.
It should be remembered that article 19 of the Hague Re.gula-
tions indirectly recognizes the right of angary, since it does not
prohibit the use of a neutral plan, but only requires it to be sent
back as soon as po ssible. That .eventually indemnities must be paid
^or it follows indirectly fromi the second part of article 53 of tl^e
16
Hague Regulations. Article 43 of these Ref^ulations defines the
duty of the occupying belli gerent. acu* Article 52 defines tbe rights
and limits of the occupying belligerent, ""ut unfortunately the
terms of t-c latter law do not impose very definite limitations up-
on the action of the commandeer s. So m.uch depends upon what they
consider to be the needs of the army o: occup ation. And
14. Westlake International Law vol. 2, p. 118
15. .^erican Law Revi ew, vol . o2 ,p . 445
, , IP, npp»nV.f.im, Tnternational Law, p. 396

I^'a^ue law 46 states that private property must "be respected. It
is difficult to make a proper differentiation "between respect for
private property and particularly private neutral property, and the
necessity of the army; in war it is impossible.
3. Requi sition of private neutral property in territorial waters
In territorial waters, the objects that can be requisitioned,
are naturally ships. In maritime warfare as well as land warfatre
ships are useful to either belligerent, '^or instance, in case of
land warfare, the belligerent intends to occupy an island belonging
to the enemy state, he must then transport his troops across, or
he^need ships in order to blockade a watercourse by sinking them
at its mouth etc. In fact the practice of requisitioning neutral
ships in his harbors and compelling them and their crews to trans-
port troops, war material, and provisions to a certain destination
on pa3rraent of freight by the belligerent, was not uncom.mon in the
past. The validity of this was recognized by the English law as
seen in the first chapter, though such practice is not regarded as
a legitimate exercise of the right of angary.
The modern view of the right of requisitioning private neutral
ships may be best discerned in the United States TJaval War Code of
1900, article 6, which provides:
"If military necessity should require it, neutral vessels
found within the limits of the belligerent authority may be seized
or destroyed or otherwise utilized for military purposes, but in
17
such cases the owners of neutral vessels must be fully recompensed'.'
In the case of TJ. S. v. Dickelman, the Suprem.e Court emphatically
laid down the rule that ships which voluntarily enter a foreign
port thereby place themselves under the laws of that port, whether
in time of war, or of peace. In other words, neutral vessels enter
17. International Discussion 1903, p. 36
i
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a '-lelligerent port at t>'eir own risk. They cannot claim the priv-
ileges of international commerce in time of war, without s.u"b.ject-
ing themselves to the helligerent rights, and operations of war,
Neutral ships and neutral property in helligerent territory enjoy
the rights, and must share the liabilities of the ships and pro-
perty of citizens of the state, save in so far as they are exenpt-
18
ed "by treaty or hy rules of international law.
In theory and in practice, there has heen developed with re-
gard to the requisition of ships, especially of private neutral
ships, a special legal institution to which different names have
been given. Many wri ters consi der t}iat the case of the "^"^apoleo^a
expedition into "fi^gypt in 1798, which was carried in a fleet large-
ly made up of neutral ships commandeered in T^rench ports for that
purpose, was a revival of the right of angary. In fact, they even
consider that it is a modern right of angary in contradistinction
to the obsolete right to compel neutral ships and their crews to
19
render certain service. However, a great deal of confusion has
existed, in the minds of many writers on international lav/, as to
the scope and status of t^-is right, especially with regard to re-
quisitions of private neutral shps. For example, Spaight identifi-
ed the right of angary with prestation. Halleck says it is akin to
the right of prestation, embargo, or arrest de princes, Fhillimore
says it is always classified with reprisals and embargo by writers
on international law, Fhillipson says the terros prestation and an-
gary are novi? used interchangably.
It thus appears that t- e only ground for a distinction as
made by every few authorities who attempt adistinction at all, is
that the very vessels are hired by the bel li gerent and freight
18, Minnesota lav/ Review vol. ? p.4?5
19. OPPe^-'-si^. International Law. vol.? p. 395
i
-.paid in advance in case of prestation, which in case of angary, if
referred particularly to ships: alone, they are appropriated and des-
troyed, compensation or indemnity being made later. The right of
angary is somewhat related to the right of preemption and to ar-
restde princes, "but no confusion need arise in distinguishing them.
Preemption is the belligerent right to requisition neutral cargoes
which are conditional contraband, provided a just compensation or
purchase price is paid to the owners of the goods. This right is
exercised on the high sea. Arrest de Princes is the right of a bel-
ligerent to detain neutral vessels which are imports in order that
they may not carry news of some military event which would be valu-
able to the enemy. The loss caused to the owners of the detained
vessels is made good by the belligerent which detains them. The
embargo has been employed for a still different purpose; that is,
to gain possession of neutral vessels found in port on the breaking
out of war; to be used for transportation of munitions or troops,
or for the other temporary, belligerent purposes. It is difficult
to distinguish this from seiaure of innocent neutral vessels at
any later period of war -^or the use of the belligerent government .^'^
I might say that, in general, with the exception of preemption
which is exercised on the open saa, all these other terms are closely
related to the right of angary which affects any private neutral
property te^mporarily situated within territorial jurisdiction. No
matter in what form the private neutral vessels may be requisitioned^
the right of angary, in case of appli cat ion , : i s maintained on the
part of the belligerent, as one based on the theory of emiaent
domain or territorial jurisdiction. This view is similarly held by
many writers. Halleck says "by virtues of the right of angary neu-
tral vessels may be appropriated by a belligerent on payment of a
20. Am. Jour. Int. Law, Vol. 13, pp. 280-281, (April 1919)
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reaso.nalrle price for cor-pensation, " It is an act of the state "by
which foreign as well as domestic vessels which happen to he within
the iurisdiction of the state are seized upon and compelled to tr-
ansport soldiers, ammunition, or other instruments of war. Writing
in 1789, De Martens declared that "it is doubtful if the comm.on law
of nations gives a helligerent, except in case of extrer.e necessity
the riffht of seizins? neutral vessels lying in its ports at the out-
23
"break of war, in order to m.eet the requirem.ent of the services.
Though v/e see that the right of requisitioning neutral ships is
based on eminent domain, it cannot "be said that it may he exercised
without being under urgent necessity.
However, the use of neutral vessels brought in for an alleged
offense or liable to detention is not exactly similar to that of
innocent neutral vessels found in a belligerent's harbors; but the
underlying principle of necessity is the same in each case. More-
over, we m.ay refer to t^ e analogy furnished by friendly aliens in
belligerent territory. Under the custom.ary rule of international
law, though they may not be taken into the belligerent's army for
service abroard in the absence of special Conventions v/ith their
states authorizing it, they may none the le^s be com.pelled to per-
form police or military service in case of necessi ty-for example,
24
to repeal a threatened imzasion. And if a neutral vessel which
attempted to escape from requisition, in time of ^^^» ^^"^ case
of necessity, it would be liable to confiscation. Thus we have
seen that the right of requisitioning pr i vate neutral ships in
21. Halleck' s International Law, vol l,p.520
22. Phillim.ore, International Law, vol 3, p. 50
23. Minnesota Law Review, vol 3, p. 417
24. American law Pevi ew , vol . 52 , p . 456
25. Taylor, International Public Taw, p. 702
I.
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territorial water s( as some writers maintain that it is a modern
right of angary) can he exercised in time of v/ar and in case of
necessity if com.pensation is paid, hecause the law of every state
is supreme over hoth persons and property within local jurisdic-
tion. If this is true, it is difficult to see why vessels alone
should he taken; why not specie also, or carg;oes of arms and ammu-
nition, or indeed anything the "belligerent is in need of for wa.r-
26
like purposes. As a matter of fact the jurisdiction of a belli-
gerent is seldom exercised over neutral goods which are only tem.-
porarily within the country. "Put this limitation is essentially
self-im-DO sed; it is a concession which is made to neutral interests
on the ground of ouhlic policy and convenience. It is a relaxation
of the right of the belligerent state rather than an acknov/ledg:e-
m.Gnt of the legal claim of the neutral. Moreover, we should no-
tice that if the right of requisitioning neutral vessels is based
on territorial jurisdiction, there is no material difference in
principle between the rules which should govern the requisition of
instruments of commerce on land and in port. The two cases are cl-
early analogous. To me the 19th Article of the 5th convention, is
by necessary implication equally adapted to transportation by sea,
because it would be unfair if the right of requisitioning private
neutral ships should be denied when the right of requisitioning
rolling stock on land was recognized,
^' Requisition o f priva te neutr al property on the open sea.
Martime war, owing to the conditions of space is found to af-
fect the rights of neutrals more than land war, and it was much
earlier fo .^^nd necessary to reg-ulate it and to introduce seme kind
of judicial control over capture. Special courts, the first courts
wh e re any t> i n
g
i n th e natu re^ of international law was administered
26, Lawrence, Principles on International Law,p,6?8
27, Finnesota Law Review, vol,?- ,p, 423

date from the 13th century. "Pelli^^erent rights may be maintained
in their stringency longer upon the sea than on land, hut they
have always heen more subject to order on that element. T> e sea is
the highway of commerce of all nations, belligerent's and neutrals
alike; and before respect for the property of enemies had been es-
tablished, sovereigns found it was necessary to regulate capture
28
judicially in order not to irritate neutrals . On land, progress
was slower because there was less opportunity for the influence of
comimon consent and because the institution of private property was
not fully established. The supreme lord's right of eminent domain
was widely enforced in war time. The rights of offense balanced
the rights of defense and between the two private property had no
protection in tim.e of war. As nations became more settled and pi;i-
vate war was gradually abolished, the conception of private proi^
perty became more fiXed. From the time of the Peace of Westphalia
it may be said that a continually developin-? series of rules, de-
pendent for their authority on custom and the common consent of
nations, has regulated tlie actions of European states to one an-
other in war as well as in peace. The rules of war on land have
not been admiini stered in any court or possessed any other coercive
sanction, but none the less they have continuously modified prac-
tice in the direction of humanity. The usage of war at sea, on the
other hand, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries re-
ceived the formi of positive law, as the decisions of Prize Courts
of each nation, defining the rights of maritime capture over the
prog^rty of belligerents and neutrals, were reported and collect-
ed, "f^ov/ever, the history of war on sea does not show the sam.e
progress in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as the hist-
ory of war on land, nor a corresponding reform, in the nineteenth
28, Bentwich.War and private Proioerty p.
5
29. Bentwich . V/ar and Private Property p. 5-7
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century. The theory of the Oreat ^ aritime powers as expressed in
treaties v/as at variance with their practice daringwar. Despite
treaties and -nrofesBion, all nations habitually confiscated pri-
vate enemy property at sea whenever they found it. So much for
the status of private property on land as well as on the high seas
-a»4-with reference to the right of capture and seizure,
AS regards the requisition of private neutralships and pro-
perty on the high seas, no treaties of regulation can he found,
though we will find wealth of material in the treaties dealing
with the status, of the requisition of neutral ships as are within
the sovereignty of the helligerent, that i s to say within his
territorial \mters or in the waters of the enemy state. But the
principles of the ius an^ariae were especially intended to be ap-
plied on the high seas. In the ancient practice of maritime it
happened that the states sent forth t>ieir ships on the high seas
to seize all vessels they encountered even neutral vessels, in or-
der that they might be equipped for warfare and used for that pur-
pose. It was against this practice that the treaties of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries(as will be shown later) dealing
with the abolition of the iu s angari ae were directed. But it might
be asserted that the prevailing judgement is to the effect that no
belligerent m.ay proceed in such unrestrained m.anner, but so far as
the right of requisitioning private neutral, ships is concerned, it
is restricted to those v.'hich are found in his ports or in his
31
territorial waters. A ship on the high see^ is only subject to the
sovereignty of the state whose flag it flies, and accordingly it
may not forthwith be used by any other states for use in the con-
duct of a war. The term "high seas" is used in international law,
to fix the limits o f the open ocean, upon which all peoples. -qo-
30. Ibid, p. 13-14
31. Memorandum of Authorities on the Law of Angary, p. bo
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Bsess common rights--the great highway of nations, Thereft>re neu-
tral shipping need in no way submit to any directions on the part
of the belligerent. But this does not mean that a neutral can do
anything that is of advantage to any particular favored beliier-
ent. It is true that international law recoginizes cases in which
the belligerent may exercise sovereign rights against neutral
ships, namely, in case of breach of blockade, or of the transport-
ation of contraband, of unneutral aid, etc. AJ.! these regulate the
behavior of the neutrals. Under the practice of several maritime
states the carriage of goods conditionally contraband was followed
by preemption; that is, forced purchase at the cost of the goods
plus freight and a reasonable profit. The Declaration of London
expressly admits such preemption or requisition subject to the
payment of compensation, first, in the case of arts and materials
serving exclusively for care of the sick and wounded,*'*' and second-
ly, in the case of contraband found on a vessel encountered at sea
making a voyage unaware of hostilities or of contraband declar-
ations af:^ecting her cargo, or if the master, having become aw^^re
o:^ these -Pacts, has not yet been able to discharge the contraband.*^'
And the belligerent can exercise a right of visit and search upon
the common and appropriate parts of the sea,^^ But in all these
cases the int er:Perence of the belligerent bears only the mark of a
mearsure of precaution or of a penalty for direct or indirect
participation of neutral ships in the hostilities. A legal prin-
ciple according to which neutral ship might also be subject to re-
32. Moore, International Law Digest, vol.2, p. 885
33. Bentwich, Declaration of London, p. 78
34. Ibid, p. 83
35. Moore, International Law Digest, p. 886
t
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quisition on the part of a "belligerent would "be outside the system
of the rules of maritime warfare as they exist with regard to neu-
trals. Requisition of private neutral r^roperty, if admissible at
all, on the high seas, wo .Id easily enahle a warshin to continue
hostilitier:- longer than it would he poss^ihle were it solely depend-
ant upon the supplies which it carries. It might he correct to ad-
36
mit that such requisitions are absolutely forbidden. Mr. Oppenheim
holds that the m.odern right of angary consists in the right of bel-
ligerents to make use of or destroy in case of necessity for the
purpose of offense and defense, neutral property on their own or
enemy territories, or on the open sea. He continues that; If pro-
perty of subject of neutral states is vested with enemy character,
it is not neutral property in the strict sense of the term, neutral
and all rules respecting appropriation, utilization, and destruc-
tion of enemy property abviously apply to it. Certainly in the case
of requisitioning neutral property on the open sea, he does not
mean that it is other than unneutral service. Yet he seems to be
confused in holding that the right of angary also included the re-
quisition of neutral property on the high sea in case of unneutral
service or contraband.
If the right of requisitioning private neutral property is
considered to be the modern and accepted form of the right of
angary, it consists of the rig^- t to use or even to destroy r.rivate
neutral property which is temporarily on his own or on enemy terri-
tory subject to the payment of compensation. It applies not only to
neutral vessels, railways, and other means of transport, but also
to war mate ri als and equiment. lorovisions. and other a.r_ticles
36. Femorandum of Authorities, on the Lav; of Angary, p. 55
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necessary for military purposes. It does not ariply, however, to
such property of neutrals as is liable to seizure or destruction
under the law of contrahand, unneutral service, and "blockade.
37. American Law Review, vol. 5S , p. 453
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Chapter III
Requisition of Private Neutral Property in acoordance with
Treaties
V/e have seen that private neutral property r.ay he re-
quisitioned either on the territory of a belligerent state or with-
in occupied territory, in territorial waters or on th-- open sea. In
the case of the latter, it can he requisitioned only when it is
vested with enemy character "by violating the law of contraband, un-
neutral sercice, and blockade, and it is not within the sphere of
the right of angary, '''or the requisition of private neutral pro-
perty on- the territory of a belligerent state and in territorial
water we find a wealth of materia,! in the treaties, but there is
scarcely any contractual law that will neet t^-.e ^two cases. In
these treaties, regarding requisition on land, we f indjp ro vi sions
agreed upon with regard to the extent in which the property of the
neutrals of the two contracting parties is subject to r^Alitary re-
quisitions. Such provisions are generally established for peace
and war tines. According to their phraseology, it can not always
be stated with certainty. In treaties regarding requisition in
territorial waters we find also a variety of modes in the matter of
compensation. "KTevertheless , for the study of our subject, such pro-
visions s.re of special ir-por tance.
1. Tre; tie£- r e-arii n,^: requisition in the territory of a belli-
gerent state .
Treaties directed to that purpose, may be found in large num-
bers. According to the regulations agreed upon they may be divided
into three main categories: 1. Treaties in v/hich the contracting
states renounce the recourse to requisitions against neutrals of

the other contrac tingparty residing within their territory. 27
This is especially agreed upon in treaties concluded hetween the
^reman Empire and the central and South American Repuhlics. Arti-
cle 7 of the treaty with Oolomhia of July 23, 1892, provides:
The nationals of one contracting party shall, within the
territory of the other party, he free from extraordinary war con-
trihutions, conpulsory loans. The other agreements are nearly i-
dentical with one another, >ased upon the following type( Article 5
of the treaty with Salvador , June , 13 , 1870)
:
The Salvadoreans in aermany and the Germans in Salvador shall
he free hoth f ro all personal military services and from all
extraordinary war con trihutions , compulsory ? o ans ,m.i li tary re-
quisitions or services of any nature whatever, "further m.ore, they
may in all cases regarding their movable and immovable property
"be subjected to no other burdens, taxes, and contributions other
than such as may be required of their own nationals or of the na-
2
tionals of the m.ost favored nation.
In the treaty of commerce and navigation with Spain, July 12,
1883, article 6 reads as follows:
The neutrals of each of the high contracting parties, within
the territory of the other shall be free from all military re-
quisitions and services, however they may be called, and which mp.y
be imposed for military ,but wit>iout prejudice to the obligation
to furnish quarters and of other neutral service for the armed
power, in so far as this obligation is im.posed upon the inlanders.
The test of article 3 of the treaty of commerce concluded be-
tween the German lilmpire and Serbia, August, 1892, is of a similar
nature.*^ 2. Treaties according to which requisitions are a dmissi-
1. Memorandum of Authorities on T:ie Law of i\ngary,p.ll
2. Ibid. p. 11
3. Ibid. p. 12
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ble only in case they appear as taxes connected with the possess-
ion of landed property. Thus, in the treaty with Yexico of i),ecera-
her 5,1882, Article 14 reads as follows ; '^"furthermore , ti"ey( that is
to say, t>!e nationals of each of the contracting^ parties) shall he
freed from fDreed loans as well as from taxes, requisitions and
contrihutions for purposes of a foreign war in so far as these are
not imposed upon immovahle property within the country, in which
latter case they are to he "borne hy the nationals of the other
4
party exactly in the same way as by the citizens.
Article 4 of the treaty with Rumania of October 21,1893,
excerpts--
Military services and exactions which may be required of all
5
inlanders as owners .lessors or lessees of immovable property.
In other treaties, in which even the mere admissibility of
such requisitions in determined, requisitions that affect the re-
spective subjects as owners of immovable property, a clause of
most favored nations is still added. In the treay of the ^-erman
lUrapire with Russia of T^ebruary 10, January 29,1894, article 3,
only the admissibility rf billetings and the i^-position of special
6
taxes is recognized. 5. XVeaties in which it is agreed that the
nationals of the other contracting party are subject to the treaty
between Germany and Sweden of ¥ay 8, 1916, reads as follows:
They( t- at to say, the nationals of the one contracting
party who sojourn or have taken up their domicile within the terri
tory of the other party) shall not be subject to any other military
services and requisition in peace tim.e and in war time than those
to which the inlanders are subject and the nationals of the two
parties shall be mutually entitled to damages such as are deter-
mined in favor of the inlanders of the two coun tries according to
4. Ibid p. 13 6, Ibid p. 13
5. Ibid p. 13

the laws therein in force,
'
In a treaty between the German Smpire and Greece of July 9,
June 27, 1884, there Is also almost favored nation clause (Article
5) which reads as follows:
"The nationals of each of the two high contracting parties
shall be freed within the territory of the other party from all
military requisitions and services—-excepting therefrom however,
military services and requisitions that may be required of the
inlanders and of the nationals of the most favored nation. "°
Prom what we have seen no unilateral regulation has been
effected through treaties, and we find no international arrangement
on the basis of which it might be said that the contracting parties
consider such a rule as appertaining to the accepted law of nations
Yet is improbable to ascertain -frora them the legal view points
that in a treaty heavier burdens are imposed for the nationals of
the respective states, than those which might impose in any event
in accordance with the law of nations.
It has been asserted by many writers that war taxes may be
laid upon the landed property of neutrals in the territory of
one of the belligerent parties, but that the movable property
of nationals of neutrals states found within the war zone or
within the territory of one of the belligerents may not be
touched, so long as they themselves refrain from participating
in war like operations. This view cannot be regarded as tenalle
for war taxes might fall within the category of contributions
which, being seriously regulated by the law of war, can only be
levied by the occupant in case of military necessity; and
7. Ibid, p. 13
8. Ibid, pl4
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novable property, such as railway naterial or rolling stock, that
;inay be requisitioned in case of absolute necessity, has been
recognized by the Hague Regulations. In view of the treates con-
cluded by the contracting powers, we should remember, however, that
feey hold always if one of the contractiog powers is involved in a
war in which the other one remains neutral,
2. Treaties regarding; the requisition in territorial waters .
We have found that European sovereigns usually claimed a
right of irapressin--'; vessels, whether domestic or foreign found
within their waters for the purpose of transport in time of war.
^ut even outside the ports, and on the open seas, ships were also
stopped to be used in the service of the state. The status of
this is found in Selden' s reports from the Decrees ofFing Sd^ward
the III, in which it is ordered that all ships of ten tons burden
and v/i-ich have already made passage and been found in the southern
and western seas, may be stopped and armed in order to serve the
T^ng-such was the usage under King Edward III, and also of other
9
English Kings. There is hardly any contractual law that deals
with this case. It may be due, to the fact that the open sea has
been unanimously recognized by all nations as the common highway
where ships are subject to no requisition whatever on the part of
the belligerent, except in case of the violation of neutrality,
rn the other hand, the requisition of neutral ships in territorial
waters as claimed by most writers as the right of angary and was
originally a royal prerogative. That the right was much abused may
be surmised from the character of the prohibitory clauses appear-
ing in some of the seventeenth century treaties that the vessels
of th ej^on tract in g parties shall not be seized. If seizure is ab-
solutely necessary, the consent of the owners must be obtained.
9. Memorandum of Authorities on the Law of Angary, p. 28
i
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Evidently, "before the treaty stipulations, vessels rr.ust have been
seized for almost any purpose, and the personnel of the vessels
10
were seized and forced to serve within thein. It would follow from
this that the requirement of the consent of the owners of the
vessels is equivalent to denying the right of r equi si ti onin^j pri-
vate neutral s'-ips at all. Such trea'^ies continued down to the
end of the ei^iteenth century. The reBult was that the practice
11
fell into diMuse.
As a result of the ''apolecnic War, the peace of the right of
requi si tionina^neutro.l ships in territorial waters in internation-
al law was radically changed. The change cane ahout from the pre-
cedent established hy --^apoleon in 1789. In the midst of his wars,
he, as the head of the Directorate; issued an order which pro-
vided for the requisitioning of s^ips in the Vrench ports of
12
Vecchia, "NJice, T'^arsei lies , and others.
Prior to this event, hy the treaty of 178 5 hetv/een Prussia
and the United States, Article 16, it was provided "that the sub-
jects or citizens of each of the contracting parties, their ves-
sels and effects shall not "be liahle to any^emhargo , or detention
on the part of the other for anv military expedition or other
13
public or private purposes whatsoever,"
With this precedent freshly in mind the negotiators revised
the treaty with Prussia in 1799. Therefore the above clause was
inserted a provision authorizing the requisition of vessels of
the respective countries , but providing that "the proprietors of
the vessels which shall have been detained v/hether for some mili-
tary expedition, or for v/hat other use soever, shall obtain from
the p-f vernrent that shall have employed them, an equitable in-
10. Am. Jour. Int. Law. , vol.l3,p.?68 (April, 1919)
^
11. Pitt Cobbett, Leading eases on International Law, vol?.„P
12. TAinnesota Taw Review, p. 417 n+hP-?^w\rI
-l^,.^laIlffiLJtora,tigS and Conventions between U.S. and ot er
powers
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demnity, as well as for the freight as for the lose occasined lay
the delay.
It should be noticed, however, that from that time the old
form of the right of angary, (that is, that the personnel of the
ships were seized and compelled to serve with them) is practically
obsolete and scarcely likely to be revived. The exercise of the
right is no longer based on royal or official prerogative, but
rests on military necessi ty and it took less arbitrary and op-
pressive character.
Treaty stipulations similiar to those of the revised treaty
between the United States and Prussia in 1799 are to be found to
a considerable extent in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The parties concerned and the nature of the stipulations will be
set forth presently.
In a treaty of 1828 between the United States and Brazil,
Article 7 provides that the citizens of the contracting parties
shall "not be liable to any embargo nor be detained with their
vessels, cargoes or merchandise or effects, for any military ex-
pedition nor any public or private purpose whatever, without
allowing to those interested a suf-^icient indemnification."-^^
Article 8 of the treaty of 1830 with Venezuela,^''' article 8
of the treaty o-^ 1870 with Salvador, and article 8 of the treaty
of 1831 with Mexico all are to the same effect. It is neither
required that the indemni-^icati on should have been agreed upon in
advance, nor that it should be paid in advance. But article 12 of
the treaty of 1870 with Peru, and article 2 of the treaty of 1858
with Bolivia, similarly provide as follows:
14. Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, p. 1492
15. Pitt Cobbett, Leading Cases on International Law, Vol.2,
p,268
16. Malloy, Treaties and Conventions, p. 133
17. Ibid. p. 183 18. Ibid. p. 1553 19. Ibid. p. 1088
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"Nor shall they (the citizens of either countr.y)'be liahle to
any enlDargo , or he detained with their vessels, cargoes, merchan-
dise, goods, effects, v/ithout heing allowed therefore a full and
sufficient indemnification, which shall in all cases he agreed
20
upon and paid in advance." Only article P of the treaty of 1830
hetween the United States and Turkey provides:
"i^'erchant vessels of the two contracting parties shall not
he forcehly taken for the shipment of troops, munitions and other
objects of war, if the captains or proprietors of the vessels,
PI
shall he un-^willing to freight them."
Germany has also entered into agreement winch are, in general^
similar to those of the United States, with Salvador, Portugal,
Costa Rica, Fexico, the Dom.inican Republic, Guatemela , Honduras,
Colom.hia, Hicaragna, Spain and Fawaii, The agreements reached in
?2
these treaties differ from each other in matters of detail. As
regards the matter of indemnification for the requisition of
foreign ships for v/ar service in the interest of the state three
different regulations have been agreed upon in the various treat-
ies: the indemnification is either to be paid in advance, or it
shall merely be determined in advance, or it is merely agreed that
indermification shall be paid.
In former times "Prance concluded certain treaties v/hich were
intended to abolish com.pletely, betv;een the contracting parties,
the requisition of neutral ships in any form v/hatever. As a re-
sult of the precedent established by Uapoleon in 1789, France in
more recent years, by treaties vvhich she concluded, has adopted
views Fim.ilar to those of the United S tates and the Gennan empire -
20. Ibid., p. 1415 andp.115
21. Ibid.,p.l31B
22. Memorandum of Authorities, pp. 36-3
9
23. Ibid., p. 48
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Italy has also concluded a nuraber of treaties on the subject
and follows different systems.
According to the King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions,
1913, of Great Britain, Article 494 provided:
"If any British merchant ship, the nationality of which is
unquestioned, should be coerced into the conveyance of troops or
into taking part in other hostile acts, the senior naval officer,
should there be no diplomatic or consular authority at the place,
is to remonstrate with the local authorities and take such other
steps to assure her release or exemptions, as the case may demand,
and may "be in accordance with these Regulations,**
By this, the belligerent is denied the right to seize a neutral
ship for such service as would be connected with direct hostilities
or represent an assistance contrary to neutrality. But whether this
denial on the part of Great Britain is in harmony with tne existing
international law, there is much doubt. It is certainly of the
highest importance when the greatest maritime power expressed itself
to that end.
However, it should be noticed that with the exception of the
Danish-Prussian Treaty of June 17, 1818, and two Italian treaties
with San Domingo and Nicaragua of October 18, 1886, and June 25,
1906, respectively, all the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
allow the exercise of the right requisitioning private neutral
ships with full indemnity, and that the seventeenth and eighteenth
century treaties excepting the revised treaty of 1799 betv/een the
United States and Prussia, relate to the old right. But the
question comes up as to the stitus of the right in the absence of
treaty stipulations. In this case, is it exercisable at all, and
24. A. J. I. L. April 1919, p. 271
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if so, is compensation due? Hall believes that "it is possible
that a right to compensation might be generally held to exist apart
from treaties. In the case of U. S. U. Dickelman in 1875, the
Supreme Court laid down the rule that:
"Neutral ships and neutral property share the liabilities of
the ship and property of citizens of the state, save in so far as
they are exempted by treaty or by the rules of international
law."^^ T he U. S. Naval War Code of 1900 provides that under
military necessity, neutral vessels found within the limits of bel-
ligerent suthority may be requisitioned, the amount of the indemnity
should be agreed on in advance with the owner or master of the
vessel. Due regard must be had to treaty stipulations upon the
matter,^"^ Dr. Bentwich says: "In the nineteenth century a few
treaties with South American states have provided for compensations
in case of seizure; bet^/^een 3uropean countries this condition is
will understood and has not to be specially stipulated for."^^
Whatever it may be, it has been the practice among nations
that the right of requisitioning private neutral vessels exists,
even in the absence of a treaty recognizing it, but that a treaty
renders the position of the affected neutral more secure as regards
indemnity or compensation which might be given without the treaty.
This has indeed been the case in the three notable exercises of the
right, namely, by Napoleon I in 1798, by Prussia in 1870, and by
the United States, Great Britain, and other powers during the recent
war,
25. Hall, International Law, p. 742
26. Minnesota Law Review, Vol.2, p. 423
27. International Law Discussion, 1903, p. 36
28. Bentwich, War and Private Property, p. 39

Chapter IV
The Attitude of Authorities toward the Requisition of
Private '"Teutral Property.
Before attempting to classify the authorities, one important
point has to he home in mind, that those authorities who wrote
hefore 1798 generally were writing of the old right which included
the seizure of the personnel of the vesnels. Therefore their op-
inions are not to he placed in the same category as t'ose who
wrote later. Yet in the earliest part of the seventeenth century,
we find that in the most eel eh rated work. De Jure "Pel li ac Pacis o f
Grotius, .the most di s tin rui shed writer, stated that seizure of neu
tral goods hy a belligerent coula he regarded as proper only if
the latter could prove a "right of necessity." In the parage re-
ferred to, he said:
"It may appear superfl'jous for us to treat of those who are
extraneous to the v/ar, since it is evident that there are no right
of war against them. But especially when they are neighbors, on
the pretext of necessity, we may here briefly repeat what we have
already said:-that necessity, in order to give a person a right to
another's property, must be the extremest kind-that is further
requisite, that there he not a similar necessity, on the part of
the owner;- that even when the necessity is plain, more is not
to be taken when it requires; it is sufficient, it is not to be
^
destroyed; if destroying it is requisite the price is to be paid."
This is the first attempt to base this right on deeper scientific
ground, a right which it is intended shall apply to neutral pro-
perty and especially to neutral ships. ^
1. ^rotius.De Jure Belli ac Paces, vol . 5, p. 288
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Vattel in his law of nations pu'blished in 1758 holds like
views. He says:
"If a nation has urgent need of vessels, wagons, horses, or
even the personal lahor of foreigners, it may make use of them,
hy force if consent^canno t he had, provided tVe owners are not
under a like necessity themselves. I^ut its right to these things
is merely that which necessity gives it, it must pay for the use
it miakes of them if it is ahle to do so. European practice is in
accord with t'is principle. Foreign vessels which happen to he in
port are pressed into service in time of need, hut paym.ent is made
2
accordingly.
In the passage from Irotius, it does not appear that he re-
ferred to the right of requisition of neutral ships at all, al-
thoughi. V^ittel in the final sentence of the passage quoted plainly
refers to it. Nor did either of them seem to understand the right
of angary.
In the literature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
we will find that most of the writers regard the requisition of
neutral ships as the right of angary, and that the right is recog-
nized only in time of war. There are different opinions regarding
this question, and efforts made to restrict more or less the
right of requisitioning neutral property with regard to the con-
dition under w>-'ich it may he exercised.
It has heen thought useful to divide the authorities into
four classes: 1. Those v^ho admit t>'e right of requisitioning pri-
vate neutral property, provided indeminity is paid and it is ex-
ercised in case of urgent or extreme necessity. V/riters in this
category are classed as favorahle; 2. Those Vvho are less emphatic
in admitting the right or who limit or qualify it. heing class-
2. A.J.I.L. vol.12 p. 356
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ified as favoralDle with qualifi cations, 3. ',7iiters who oppose the
righ^t.such authorities being classified as unf avorahl e. 4. Those
who merely define it or refer to other opinions , these heing class-
ed as non-corirni ttal
.
According to J. B. Harley' s classification, a separate list
is made of those who wrote before 1870 and those who came after
that date. Eefore 1R.70, there were favorable, 8; favorable with
qualifi cations, 1 ; unfavorable,?.; non-committal , none. After 1870,
there were favorable, 42 ; favorable with qualifications,?; un-
3
favorable, 16; rion-commi ttal , 5.
Those classified as favorable with qualifications and non-
committa-1, not only constitute the smallest number but represent
the element of indifference which adds little value to the right
in question. Therefore, for convenience, the authorities will be
divided into two classes-. Namely, those who are favorable and those
who are unfavorable, For clearness, it will be more important to
classify them according to their nationality, and see what will be
the difference of attitude in their national characteristics.
Thus, I will attempt to classify them into two main heads: the
Anglo -American Writers and the Continental Writers.
l, Anglo -American Wri ters .
"lalvo, the greatest of South American jurists, admits the
right of requisitioning private neutral property in case of a
foreign war, for defense, or for the safety of the state.
nir Robert Phillimore, the English jurist, declares himself
in favor of recognizing the right of angary in war times only, and
to restrict it to cases of the most extreme necessity, wit'^out at
the sam^e time drawing any distinction between ships of the belli-
gerent state and of neutrals. "But if the reaso n of the thing and
3. A.J,I~,L, ,vol.l3 p. 275 4^" A, J.I .L.vol .13Ho .2 p. 277
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paramont principle of national independence be duly considered,
it can only be excused, and perhaps scarcely then justified, by
that clear and overwhelming necessity, which could compel an indivi-
dual to seize his neighbor's horse or weapon to defend his own
life."^
Westlake states with regard to the ius angariae :
"It seems still to exist in case of real necessity, and its
exercise would be certainly subject to the duty of compensation, "
Spaight says that the right of a belligerent to seize or
destroy neutral
,
property which is passingly within his territory
or that occupied by him is not without international recognition,
'
Cobbett says that the exercise of the right of angary ought
to be founded on great military necessity and that a proper in-
demnity ought to be paid,
Oppenheim believes that under certain exceptional circumstances
9the belligerent has the right to appropriate neutral property.
Holland says that railway material, and property of other kinds
of neutrals found in territory which becomes the scene of hostilit-
ies, is liable to be taken possession of by either belligerent; but
compensation must be paid.^^
Phillipson holds that a belligerent has the right to use or
destroy private neutral property temporarily situated within his
territory or control, for reasons of public necessity provided
he is prepared to pa^? for it a proper indemnity. -^-^
6. Westlake, Internatinal Law, Part 2, p,119
7^ Spaight, War Rights on Land, p, 510
8. Cobbett, Leading Cases and Opinions on International
Law, p,261
9, Oppenheim, International Law, p. 742
10. Holland, Law and Customs of War on Land, p,9
11. Phillipson, Intern^itional Law, and the Great War, p. 72

Kalleck, the great Aneri c n writer says, "by virtue of the
right of angary, neutral vessels may be appropriated by a^belli-
gerent on payment of a reasonable price for compensation.
Taylor, another .\merican writer, says that a belligerent
has a right to use neutral property, accidentallj'' within the
theatre of wo,r, or even to destroy it when necessary, subject to
13'
liability for jijBt compensation.
14
Kent admits it in case of "strong necessity'.'
Other American autlio ri ties , such as 0. D.Allin, J. W. Garner,
and J. B, Scott, all admit that the requisition of private neu-
tral property is iustifi cable provided that compensation is paid
In a word, all these English and American jurists, and some o
others who have not been mentioned, practically 'ecognize that
due compensation should be made for the use or destruction of the
vessels,
"^To twi th standing the precedents, it must be admitted that
there are many jurists, including several Sn.^'ilish and Am^erican
writers of recent date, who either deny the legality of the
right or, as is usually the case, while admitting its validity
severely condemn its exercise and demand its abolition,
'^or example, Dana, an American writer acknowledged that
angary is recognized both by treaty and in practice, but de-
clares "It is not a right at all, but an act resorted to from ne-
cessity, for which ar^ology and compensation m.ust be made, at the
15
'
peril of war,"
The outstanding English opponent of the right is T, J. Law-
rence, who is uncompromising agains t its exercise ."Belligerents
12 , Kalleck' s International Lav/, vol, l,p, 5?0
13, Taylor, International Public Lav/, lo, 720
14, A, J, I ,L. , vol, 3, p. 277
15, Wheaton, International Law, p. 409
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must make war with their owa resouroes and what they can capture
from the enemy, not with neutral property which is unfortunate
1
6
enough to he for the moTnent in their pov/er."
The Resolution of the Institute of International Law adopted
in ]898. has also pronounced most strongly in favor of its aholi-
17
tion.
The "British Regulations and Admiralty Instructions furnish
perhaps the most striking agreement in support of this view. Art-
icle 446 provides: "In the case of any British merchant ship,
whose nationality is unquestioned, beinj^ coerced into conveyance
of troops or into takin^^ part in other hostile acts, the senior
naval officer, should there he no diplomatic or consular authori-
ty on the port, will remonstrate with the local authorities, and
take such other steps to rescure her release or exemption as the
case may demand and may "be in accordance with the Regulations,"
But this provision, it would seem is directed primarily
against the older ana now discredited form of angary, rather than
ar^ainst the present mode of exercising the right.
^."Continental Wri ters..
The viev/ that due indemnification is made for the use or
destruction of the vessels (or other neutral property) is also en-
tertained hy most of the continental writers. For example;
Dr. Ahre cht
,
a great German jurist is one of the strong-
est supporters of the right, holding that it exists, not only
when the existence of the state depends upon its exercise, hut
even in case of customary military necessity. He helieves that
neutral vessels in the waters of a helligerent are subject to ex-
18
traordinarj measures adopted hy the helli
^
gerent.
T_ .16, Lawrence Principles of Int. Law, p, 628
17. J.B, Scott, Resolution of Institute of Int. Law, p. 154
18. A.J.I .L. , vol. 13, p. 276
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Another Geman writer, named Heffter.also states that it is
admissible only as a measure in time of the most urgent necessity
19
and only provided full compensation is made. Still another
German writer allows the exercise of the right in case of military
necessity, provided ample indemnity is paid,
i3e Cussy, a French writer, "believes that the right is ex-
ercisable incase of necessity, and that it is a prerogative of
sovereignty. Ben Beer Boortagael, the distinguished Dutch writes,
in his work entitled Internation Wartime Law published in 1888,
says
:
"The right of seizure is that right which, according to many,
a belligerent state has, in case of extreme necessity, for self
preservation, to seize for its own use , the property, that is to
say, the ships of neutrals. I^ull compensation for the value of
property and complete indemnification for t: e persons injuriously
affected by the act, are required.
Some of the contenental writers take too extreme a position
in favor of the belligerent, "^or example,
nespaginet says that a belligerent can make use of neutral vessels
22
without indemnity.
Azujii , an I talian writer, boldly asserted that a neutral ves-
sel which attempted to escape from requisition would be liable to
23
confiscation.
Prerels, who is perhaps the leading German aut^'-^ority on
Seerecht is apparently ready to admit the legality of the right of
24
angary, even in its older and m.ore arbitrary form.
19. Memorandum of Authorities on Law of i\ngary,p.35
20. Ibid, p. 72
21. Am. Jour. Int. Law. vol.12 ,t). 353
22. A.J.I.L. vol. 13, p. 277 (April 1919)
23. Taylor, Treaties on International Law, p. 701
24. Minnesota Lav/ Review vol, 2, p. 419
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There are also numerous protests against the right of angary,
"but the opponents of the legality of the measure are only in a
minority. "^om what we have seen, a good majority of both the Anglo-
American and the Continental writers admit that the right may be
exercised, if indemnity or compensation is paid. And according to
the figure given "by Harley, of 79 authorities, with the exception of
eight writers who are classed as ^'avorable with qualification, and
three classed as non-committal, there are fifty writers who are
classed as facorable, while only sixteen are classed as unfavorable.
If then the facts here shown are connected with those indicated in
the classification of treaties, that only three o-^ the treaties
examined for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries forbid the ex-
ercise of the right if indemnity is paid, it ought to be said that
far from being scarcely defended, it is defended by most authrities,
by treaties, (excepting treaties made for requisition on land) and
was extended by the Hague . Conventions of 1899 and 1907 to apply to
railway materials. Therefore the conclusion may eafely be made that
80 far as these sources contribute to the making of international
law, the right exists and is exercisable.
There are two points, however, that should be borne in mind.
"First, the views of the Continental writers on the legitimacy of
angary have been greatly influenced, as Professor Oppenheim points
out, by their attitude toward the doctrine of conditional contra-
2'Sband. In an much as they deny the validity of the Anglo-American
doctrine of conditional contraband, they have been forced to set up
another principle in its place to justify the right of the belliger-
ent to preempt all goods which are bound for a hostile state. That
principle they have found in the right of angary. But preemption,
as seen above, can only be exercised on the open sea in case of
25. Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. p. 444
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carrying conditional contraband of war. .\nd on the open sea, a neu-
tral vessel is subject to no other .jurisdiction than that of V'-.e
country whose flag it flies. Therefore it may "be admitted tyiat pre-
e>nption, as claimed by the Continental writers, can never be in-
cluded within t'-e sphere of the right of angary, because the lat-
ter, as understood, only consists of the right of requisitioning
private neutral property within territorial jurisdiction.
Secondly, a n'ornber of international jurists, particularly
those of the continent, bas« the right of angary too mu h upon the
doctrine of military necessity. Von Liszt, for example, looks upon
it as a fcarm of Kriegsrai son . To him, it is of ^orce rather than
of a principle of law. Put this conception savors altogether too
rruch of Prussian. Militarism to commend i t to the great majority
of students of international la.w, '^o this interpretation of the
right is doubtless due in fact, much of the suspicion as to the
legitimacy of its existance. The true basis of the right, accord-
ing to most Anglo-American jurists, is to be found in the principle
of territorial sovereignty. The lav/ of every state is supreme over
both persons and property within the local jurisdiction. In the
case of U.S.v Dickelrnan, the supreme Court laid down emphatically
"that ship s wViich voluntarily enter a foreign port thereby place
f»
themselves under the laws of that port. This i s no doubt based
27
on the principle of territorial sovereiianty
.
26. Hall , International Law,p,74Q
27, Minnesota Law Review vol, 2 p. 423
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Chapter V
Application of the Right of Requisitioning
Private Neutral Property
1«t>nnerly European sovereigns asserted in time of war a
special prerogative, whereby foreign vessels found within their
territorial waters were not only liable to he impressed for purposes
of transport, but the personnel of the vessels were also forced to
work with them. The right was, no doubt, much abused. As a result,
we find treaties regulating such practice as late as the eighteenth
century. And some writers considered the right of angary as obsol- [
ete as far as its usage v/as concerned* It was not until the close
of the eighteenth century when Napoleon again called the practice
into play.^ This case witnessed a revival of the right. And with
the development of human methods of warfare and a more general re-
cognition of the rights of neutrals in the nineteenth century, the
right of angary was much ameliorated and became less oppressive.
One of the cases which furnishes confirmatory evidence of the
rise of neutral vessels by Napoleon is the case of Carolina , de-
cided in the British High Court of Admiralty, April 30, 1802. This
was a Sv/edish vessel which had been used by Napoleon to transport
troops to Egypt, The owner of the vessel brought his claim for dam-
ages against the British Government, but Sir William Scott decided
that he must resort to the French Government for claim. Evidently
the British authority recognized the fact that within territorial
jurisdiction a belligerent has a right to dispose of any neutral
vessel or property.
1, Taylor, A Treatise on International Law, p. 767
2. A. J. I. L. Vol. 13, p. 286
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There are a few important facts, however, that should be not-
iced in regard to the kinds of neutral property that may "be requis-
itioned, and the forms of the right of angary. As to the kinds of
property, the text writers on the subject may be divided into tT;o
categories; (1) those who confine the doctrine of angary to ships
and vehicles; and (2) those who extend it to neutral property
generally. According to my view, the right, if exercisable at all
under certain circumstances, must be applied to all neutral property
generally, if it is serviceable for war operations. Professor
Oppenheim says that all sorts of neutral porperty, whether it
consists of vessels, or other means of transport, or arms, ammunr
itions, provisions or other personal property, may be the object of
the right of angary, provided that the articles conceived are serv-
iceable to military ends and wants.
As to the right of angary, suffice it to say that it may be
extended not only to appropriation, but to destruction and detention
of private neutral property. The facts in question will be revealed
in the fallowing cases:
With regard to the appropriation of railway material, we may
recall that in 1870 the Germans seized in Prance more than 600 rail-
way carriages belonging to the central bwiss Railway company, as
well as a large quantity of Austrian rolling stock, and utilized
4them in their military operations. This form of the right of
angary is now specially recognized by article 19 of the 5th Con-
vention of 1907, which says: "Railv/ay material coming from the
territory of neutral powers, whether it be the property of the said
powers or of companies or of private persons, a-nd recognizable as
3, Oppenheim, international jjaw, ¥ol.2, p. 595
4. westlake, international Law, Vol, 2, p,118

such, shall not be requisitioned or utilized by a belligerent except
in so far as is absolutely necessary, it shall be sent back as soon
as possible to the country of origin,**
ifOT the particular form of the right of angary, namely the
destruction of neutral vessels situated temporarily in belligerent
territory, there is a noteworthy precedent in the Franco-German War.
At the end of 1870, the uermans seized six British coaling vessels
lying in the Kiver Seine, near xJuclair, and sank them, because
the German commander at Rouen wanted to block the passage of the
river so that (French gunboats might be prevented from approaching.
In answer to the British representations made on behalf of the
owners and crews, Bismark expressed the regret of his government,
and declared that if acts had been done beyond what was necessary,
the guilty persons would be called to account. At the same time he
contended that the proceeding was in conformity with the existing
right of angary. The British reply admitted the tenability of the
contention, and merely requested the payment of indemnity, which was
a-^terwards satisfactorily arranged.^
The right in question also extends to the detention of neutral
ships found within belligerent jurisdiction, where this is require*
for military reasons, no during the American civil war, the ijabuan,
a i^ritish vessel, was detained by the united States authorities in
order to prevent the 4i^vulgence of important information with
respect to a military expedition then about to be dispatched, an
indemnity for the detention being subsequently paid.
As stated before, neutral property domiciled in another coun-
try acquires the character of the subjects of th-it country, and a
5. Ibid., p,118
6, Cobbett, Leading Cases on International Law, Vol. 3, p. 341

belligerent, in applying the right of eminent domain, may, in case
of urgent necessity, requisition any neutral property, i^ut there
are exceptions to this rule. For example, the experience of the
Transvaal annexation seems to show that special favor may be ex-
tended to neutral corporations, as regards the contraotional rights
of semi-public character."^ -by the old law a neutral corporation
which carried on its operations in the enemy country would have been
held by domicile to be an alien enemy. i5ut the economic features of
the world have changed since then, and have made it desirable to pay
regard to the real rather than nominal character of companies in war
time. The latest practice points to a change in this direction, but
some definite pronouncement upon the position of enemy and neutral
corporations in war is much to be desired. The English practice,
however, so far as it goes, is instructive. The iSnglish commission-
ers also showed a disinclination to press against neutral share-
holders. J3ut they declared that a company may acquire technical
enemy character by being incorporated and registered an4 by carrying
on its operations in the conquerfed country. This seems to me.
quite reasonable.
J5y far the most important use yet made of the right of angary
or the right of requisitioning neutral property generally, occurred
in the recent war. In .-.ugust, 1914, the iiritish uovernment took
over four large men of war lying, in course of construction, in her
dockyards, and destined for the neutral states of Chili and Turkey
(Turkey then being neutral). The Porte protested against this action
as being contrary to international law. isut it is a universally
recognized practice and therefore it is in accordance with the law
of nations. The British Government replied that consideration of
7. jjuntv/ich. War and ±^rivate Property* pp. 74-75

public interests necessitated the appropriation, and that full
8
pensation would be paid.
The case of the Zamora arising out of the present war and
involving the question of the right to requisition neutral vessels,
was decided in the uritish Admiralty Court in 1916. by the Judicial
CQuimitte of the Privy Council. Concerning the legal aspects of the
case, Lord Parker in rendering the judgment said, "that, at any rate
in time of war, some right on the part of a belligerent power to
requisition the goods of neutral within its jurisdiction will be
f'ound to be recognized by international usage might be expected
either to sanction the right of each country to apply in this respec
its own municipal law, or to recognize a similar right of inter-
national obligation."®
By ^ar the most important case in the exercise of the right of
angary is that of the requisition of about 1,000»000 tons of xJutch
shipping by the Allied and Associated Governments, particularly the
United States and Great Britain, within their respective ports in
March, 1918.
The "imperative milityry needs of the United States," stated
the President in his proclamation, "requires the immediate utiliz-
ation o-^ such vessels," and he added that "full compensation" could
be made to the owners "in accordance with the principles of inter-
national law* and that "suitable provision will be made to meet
the possibility of ships being lost through enemy action,"
On Warch 25, the American Legation at The Hague made public
the following statement: "'ihat the united states has not taken title
to any such ships under the present proclamation, but has merely
taken them over for temporary use,
8. Phillipson, International and The ureat War, p,72
9. irehern, r ritish and* colonial Prize oases, \iol,2. Part 6,
pp. 1-52

"Literal charterwing rates will be paid and the ships returned
at the termination of the present emergency, and not later than the
end of the war.
"The United States will assume all marine risks and the owners
will be given the options of receiving the payment of the valae of
the vessel or having the vessel replaced as soon as possible after
the termination of the war, meanwhile receiving interest on the value
of the lost vessel."
On the other hand, Mr. Balfour defended the British seizures on
the ground of the ancient right of angary, which he said was not
obsolete, and of the general right of sovereignty over all persons
and property within British jurisdiction; and he gave similar assur-
ances to those of President Wilson in regard to compensation and
restoration of the vessels.^*-*
The action of the United States government in this instance is
more justifiable than that of the British government, because of the
peculiar circumstances of the case. The United States naval Regul-
ations, as we have seen, distinctly recognize the legality of angary.
The Dutch ships accordingly entered the United States ports at their
own risk, and they knew, or ought to have known, that they were
subject to requisition at any time. On the other hand, the British
exercise of the right seems to be ambiguous, because the British
government has two lawa conflicting with each other, regarding this
particular right, namely, (l) the Civil Law, or what Mr. Balfour
called the ancient right of angary, which affirms that seizures of
neutral ships found in the British ports, are entirely within the
sovereign rights of British Empire, and (2) the King's Regulations
10. Garner, International Law and The World War
,
Vol.2,
pp.l75-l'y^; A. J. T.'TT 7oI.12, pp.335'^6
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and Admiralty Instructions (as seen above) which deny the legality
of the right.
However, the latter provision may "be defended by stating that
it is directed primarily against the older form of angary, rather
than against the present mode of exercising the right. Moreover,
the regulations do not venture to deny the legality of the practice.
They simply provide an effective means for securing the release of
British vessels which may liave been requisitioned for naval purposes
without just cause.
In this study, we are only concerned with the right of requis-
itioning private neutral property exercised by the belligerent
government in time of war. But it is worth while in this connection
to raise a question not within the field of this thesis, namely as
to whether a neutral government may exercise a similar right in
respect to the property of a belligerent enemy. The neutral govern-
ment has no reason of military necessity to assign for its action,
unless of course, indirect hardships caused by the belligerent's
action may be called a military necessity as regards the neutral.
But a neutral country certainly can strengthen the idea that the
right of angary must henceforth be regarded as a right of territoria!
or jurisdictional sovereignty, or the right of eminent domain. This
question was raised during the recent war by the action of the
governments of Italy, Portugal, and Spain in requisitioning German
merchant vessels lying in their ports, while those countries were
still officially at peace with Germany, although in the case of
Italy, diplomatic relations had been broken off.
The Italian decree, promulgated November 11, 1915, applied
particularly to the requisition of German vessels then lying in
Italian ports. The provision embodied in the decree for monthly
payments to the affected owners of the requisi*tioned vessel is
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new. Such a provision is not found in any of the treaties, nor did
the United States or Great Britain allow monthly payments to the
Dutch shipowners. ^-^
On February 27, 1916, the government of Portugal requisition-
ed all German vessels found in Portuguese territorial waters on the
ground that it had done nothing more than to exercise the right of
eminent "domain in respect to the property seized, and this was an
admitted inherent and sovereign right of all states. Moreover, the
Portuguese government relied on article 2 of a treaty of commerce
and navigation concluded between the interested parties on November
30,1908, which declared '*that ships as well as all other merchandise
or property belonging to either party, found in the territory of the
other, might be requisitioned for public use upon compensation pre-
viously agreed upon between the parties concerned," and she declared
that she would pay compensation at the end of the war. The only
question, therefore, that could be raised was whether Portugal had
exercised the right thus recognized in accordance with the procedure
set forth in the treaty. -^2
On August 31, 1918, the Spanish Government took over all Ger-
man vessels lying in Spanish ports. About 90 vessels were af-^ected.
The action of the Spanish Government furnishes a clear cut example
of a neutral seizing vessels of a belligerent, and unlike Portugal,
Spain remained neutral throughout the war. The Spanish note makes
clear that neutrality was to be maintained .that no change of title,
but only temporary use, v;as contemplated, and that the seizure was
••indispensable to its existence." Nothing is said of indemnity, but
11. A. J. I. L. Vol. 13, p. 294
12. Garner, International Law and The World War. Vol. 2,
p. 176
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it appears from the note that the Spanish Government regatded the
requisitioned vessels merely as substitutes for its own vessels sunk
by Germany and therefore that no indemnity was to be paid,-^'^
The right to requisition belligerent property, as exercised
by these neutral countries, is, indeed, recognized in the latter
part of the article 19 of the Hague Convention of 1907, which pro-
vides that a neutral power may likewise, in case of necessity, retain
and utilise to an equal extent property coming from the territory of
belligerent state, compensation to be paid by either party in pro-
-
portion to the material used and to the period of usage. This pro-
vision undoubtedly contains an implied recognition of the right of
eminent domain upon which the action of all the neutral countries is
based. It is a sound and just principle that if such a right be
conceded to belligerents, it should be equally conceded to neutrals
whose need for merchant ships during a world war may be as urgent
and imperative for the raaintainance of their economic life as the
military necessities of belligerents. The conclusion, therefore,
must be that these neutral countries were within their legal rights
in requisitioning the German ships lying in their ports, although in
the case of Portugal, there is ground for difference of opinion as to
whether her procedure was strictly in accord with her treaty with
Germany; and in the case of Spain, without stating that indemnity
would be paid, is contrary to the law of nations. True, Germany had
sunk many of her vessels during the war without just cause, but that
was the very practice that brought her to a great defeat. On the
part of Spain, the denial of payment is akin to resort to reprisal,
a deed which an honest nation would refuse to do.
13. A. J. I. L. Vol.13, pp. 298-299
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Chapter VI
Results of the Present Study with Reference
to International Law
So far as the right of requisitioning private neutral property
is concerned, we have dealt with dif-^erent phases. And we have
notived that most of the treaties concluded on the subject and most
of the jurists are in favor of the right. As regards present inter-
national law, there is a great deal of uncertainty and inadequecy
on this question. No provision of the Hague Conventions deals
directly with the question of angary in relation to ships, hut there
is in case of war on land one article, namely, article 19 of the
5th. Convention of 1907, which explicitly provides that the requis-
ition of railway material is allowed. But there is no reason why
railway material alone should be requisitioned. Why should not
ships or other means of transportation or things that are useful for
military necessity also be appropriated? This shows the inadequecy
of the Hague Convention, In fact, if the right of eminent domain
is the sacred right of any belligerent, there is no material differ-
ence in principle between the rules which should govern the requis-
ition of the instruments of commerce on land and in port.
So far, we have dealt with the question of the requisition of
private neutral property which bears no hostile character. But what
is the status of neutral property which is engaged in unneutral
service in the territory of a belligerent itself or within the
territory which is occupied? On this point, the Declaration of
London provides that:
"A neutral vessel will be condemned and, in a general way,
receive the same treatment as would be applicable to her if she were

an enemy merchant vessel;
1. If she take a direct part in the hostilities;
2« If she is under the orders or control of an agent placed on
board by the enemy government;
3. If she is in the exclusive employment of the enemy govern-
ment ;
4. If she is exclusively engaged at the time either in the
transport of enemy troops or in the transmission of intelli--
gence in the interest of the enemy.
In the cases covered by the present article, goods belonging
to the owner of the vessel are likewise liable to condemnation."-^
Evidently, it makes no difference whether *he ship voluntar-
ily or compulsorily renders the state services, for it is only asked
that the ship does, in fact, render that kind of services. If it is
innocently forced by the belligerent to perform the services, its
capture is not justifiable, because in case of unneutral service,
the property is, as a rule, confiscated rather than requisitioned.
But in time of war, it is very difficult to distinquish between a
voluntary or compulsory undertaking. If the latter case is exempted
from capture, then the belligerent would be tempted to requisition
the neutral property rather than that of her own subjects. V/ith
reference to this point we have found that the British Regulation
and Admiralty Instructions distinctly deny the right to seize a
neutral ship for such services as would be connected with direct
hostilities or represent an assistance contrary to neutrality. -Sven
the seizure of English ships for the transportation of goods repres-
enting contraband of war would lead to the interference of the ship's
commander; for transportation of contraband is also regarded by the
1. Bentwich, Declaration of London, p. 89
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English as participation in hostilities. If that is the case, no
neutral would "be willing, unless a decided advantage could be gained
(which is by no means certain in time of war), to be engaged in any
unneutral service for a belligerent who, under urgent necessity, is
liable to requisition any neutral property which happens to be
within his territorial jurisdiction. The property so requisitioned
must be directly or indirectly needed for the purposes of war oper-
ation. If transportation of troops is considered as participation
in hostilities at all, the belligerent would never have any chance
to requisition any neutral property even within his territorial
jurisdiction. This of course can hardly be universally accepted as
a part of international law. The case of the sinking of several
English vessels by the Prussians, during the Franco-Prussian war of
1870-1371, cannot be considered as a case of using neutral property
for the purpose of engaging in acts of hostility. Even the English
government accepted the decision that compensation would be made for
the loss. If destruction of neutral property is recognized, there
is no reason why appropriation of it should not be recognized also,
if adequate compensation be paid in either case.
As regards the requisition of neutral ships both in territoria]
waters of a belligerent and in ports of the occupied territory, there
is no difference in principle, if in the latter case the authority
of the enemy has been completely suspended and his own lawfully sub-
stituted by the occupant; though it must be remembered that in eithei
case, the owners should be fully compensated. That it is not a duty
of a belligerent to pay indemnity in appropriating or destroying
private neutral property to the owners, as contended by Count Bis-
mark in the case of sinking the English vessels during the Pranco-
Prussian War in 1870 (although he agreed to pay indemnity) can

hardly "be accepted in the present international law.
According to the law of war, neutral property permanently
located in the territory of the belligerent is subject to the same
treatment as the property of the nationals of the belligerent, as
far as requisitions are concerned. On the other hand, neutral
property which has had a continued sojourn in the occuped territory;,
is treated in the same manner by the occupying power as the nationab
of the occupied territory for the reason that such property, being
internally bound up with the national economy of the enemy, neces-
sarily contributes to strengthen its auxiliary resources. Article
53 of the Hague Conventions stipulates the payment of indemnities
for the seizure and utilization Of all appliances adapted for the
transport of persons or goods which are the private property of
inhabitants of the occupied enemy territory,*^ and article 52 of the
Hague Regulations stipulates payment for requisitions. If the
immunity from confiscation of private enemy property is thus re-
cognized, the position of private neutral property ought not to be
less favorable. But according to the practices of nations in land
warfare, compensation made for the requisition of private enemy
property depends upon the grace of the belligerent. Therefore,
private neutral property, through its continued sojourn, is neces-
sarily subject to the same treatment, though in either case, a civil
ized nation would not refuse to pay suitable compensation. On the
other hand, neutral property which by mere chance is found temporar-r.
ily within the territory of one of the belligerents, shall be re-
quisitioned only under very special circumstances, in case of a very
critical situation, and in such case, the respective belligerent is
2. J. B. Scott, The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, p. 125
3. Ibid., pl25

obligated to make full compensation to the owners.
Another point, though not within the sjihere of the present
study, is worthy of notice in this connection. That is, when
speaking of the requisition of "belligerent vessels by a neutral
country, as expressly recognized by the 19th article of the Hague
Regulations, we mean to apply only to those vessels in transition .
and not to those which had taken asylum in neutral ports to avoid
capture. During the recent war, the Portuguese Government, in
requisitioning the German vessels, contended that the rules of pro-
cedure regarding requisition of ships laid down in the treaty of
1908 between her and Germany, applied only to those ^n transition .
But various German newspapers regarded this circumstance as a
special reason why the German ships should not have been seized.
They were, it was agreed, in Portuguese ports as refugees against
capture by the enemy, and it was therefore a violation of the right
4
of asylum to requisition them. But the right of asylum, according
to international law, means the right of the belligerent to shelter
only under such circumstances as when their vessels are driven to a
neutral port by stress of weather, or by being otherwise reduced to
an unseaworthy condition, and this right cannot be refused by a
neutral without a breach of international law. But this is entirely
different from the fact that they take asylum in neutral ports to
avoid capture.^
In exercising the right of requisitioning private neutral
property for the transportation of troops or for other war purposes,
some writers, especially those who are in favor of its abolition,
contend that the neutral, in consenting to the exercise of the right.
4, Gamer, International Law and The World War, Vol.2, p. 179
5, Lawrence, International Law, p. 624
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commits a violation of neutrality. Thus the British Regulation
and Admiralty Instructions deny the right to seize a neutral ship
for any services as would represent an assistance contrary to
neutrality. To this contention, General den Beer answers that:
•Whenever a "belligerent, compelled by necessity, seizes upon
that which he finds ready to hand, takes possession of it and dis-
poses of it as he sees fit and assumes full liability for all
damages, then the offence against neutrality disappears, because
it is no longer the neutral but the belligerent who performs the
service."^
This is, no doubt, a very strong and wise argument for the
defense of neutrality. It may indeed be admitted also that the
requisition of neutral vessels lying within the territorial waters
of a belligerent state is an extreme right and not one to be
lightly resorted to. At the same time, if the right exists, it is
of course for the belligerent to determine when it shall exercise
the right.
As to the question of treaty stipulations, we have found in
the case of requisitioning private neutral property in the territoty
of a belligerent state, treaties in which contracting states re-
nounce the recourse to requisitions against neutrals of the other
contracting party residing within their territory; treaties accord-
ing to which requisitions are admissible only in case they appear
as taxes connected with the possession of landed property; finally
treaties in which it is agreed that the nationals of the other con-
tracting party are subject to the same taxes as the nationals. But
there is no unilateral regulation which has been affected through
treaties. It shauld also be noticed that no treaty stipulation has
6. A. J. I. L. Vol.12, p. 353

teen found in regard to the requisition of the same in occupied
enemy territory. As regards the requisition of neutral vessels in
territorial waters, all conventional provisions to which we have
referred seem not only applicable to the case when a government
requisitions neutral ships within its o^m ports, "but also to the
case when such act takes place within occupied enemy waters. A
restriction to the former case is not expressly stated in any treaty.
Prom the legal viewpoints of the states that have concluded treaties
regarding the requisition on land, it is very improbable that in a
treaty heavier burdens are imposed for the national of the respect-
ive states than those which they might impose in any event in
accordance with the law of nations. All the conventional agreements
to which reference has been made show clearly the effort to protect
the property of the respective nationals to improve its legal
status.
On the other hand, according to the juridical view of the
contracting parties with respect to the requisition of ships in
territorial waters, by means of the treaties the ships enjoy greater
privileges and are given a more favorable legal status, than they
would have according to the accepted law of nations. It is evident,
therefore, that it is more advantageous to have a treaty stipulation
for the purpose because of the fact that in case of controversy, an
express stipulation would mean a great deal in securing the right.
However, it should be noticed that a belligerent, under urgent
necessity, it not deterred from requisitioning neutral property
which happens to be within territorial jurisdiction, even without
treaty stipulation. As Pitt said: "the very circumstance of making
an exception by treaty proves what the law of nations would be if no
such treaty were made to modify or alter it,"'''
7. American Law Review, Vol.52, p. 455

Ae far as treaty stipulations are concerned, we have noticed
that most o:^ them are in favor of the right of requisitioning
private neutral property. Yet, considering the 48 powers in the
world, there would be a possibility of 1128 treaties on any given
subject provided that each power made a treaty with every other
power. As a matter of fact, only about 42 treaties regarding the
requisition of ships have been made, and practically all of them
have been made with south and central American countries. But it
makes a treraadous amount of difference if the 42 trev.ty exceptions
are made by countries of small w»ight in international affairs or
by some of the great powers.
Ae to the status of compensation, distinction must be made
between the requisition of private neutral property which is per-
manently situated in the belligerent state and that which is
accidentally within territorial jurisdiction. In the former case,
compensation, as has been discussed, depends upon the grqce of the
belligerent, because the property, through its continued sojourn,
and under some circumstances, acquires the same character as the
nationals of that state. In the latter case, according to the older
view, the belligerent was seemingly under an obligation to compens-
ate the neutral for loss of freight only,^ But it is safe to say
that this restricted view of the liability of a belligerent would
not be entertained today. In all cases full compensation should be
made, not only for the use of the vessel but also for the loss of
profit? and for the dajnage and destruction of any of the ships during
the voyages, lOienever possible an agreement for indemnity should be
arranged in advance. There are, however, three different regulations
which have been agreed upon in the various treaties: the indemnific-
8, Minnesota Law Review, Vol.2, p. 424
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ation is either to be paid in advance, or it shall merely be deter-
mined in advance, or it is merely agreed that an indemnification
shall be paid. The obligation is recognized not only in numerous
treaties, but is confirmed in spirit, if not by the letter of the
law, by article 53 of the Hague Convention, providing for compens-
ation for the use of requisitional means of communication in occupied
territory. And according to the U. S, Naval War Cade of i900,
"neutral yeseels foun(2 within the limits of belligerent authority
may be seized and destroyed or otherwise utilized for military pur-
poses, if military necessity should require it, but in such cases
the owner of neutral vessels must be fully recompensed. The amount
should be agreed on in advance with the owner or master of the
vessel,'*
As to the amount of compensation which will be given, no
treaty has ever furnished any right. Indeed, the fixing of the
amount would be a considerable task and man^ factors must enter in.
The suggestion of Bismark in 1871, that if Prussia and Gre&t Britain
could not agree on a fair amount, it should be submitted to an
arbitrator, is sound. And in view of the recent war, it would seem
to be well, for the sake of the sanctity of treaties, that treaty
clauses providing that indemnity be fixed in advance might give way
to clauses allowing indemnity to be '^ixed by a disinterested commis-
sion of experts or by arbitrators,. This should, however, be done
after the emergency is passed,^
In conclusion, we may state the general principle that the
right of requisitioning private neutral property or the right of
angary in general, based on the right of eminent domain, is divis-
ible into two main categories; first, as regards the use or des-
9, A. J. I. L. Vol, 13, p. 300
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truction of neutral property which has continued sojourn in belli-
gerent territory; and, secondly, as regards the use or destruction
of the same which is merely passingly within territorial limits, as
some writers consider that as the right of angary. In the former
case, compensation depends upon the grace of the belligerent state,
while in the latter, compensation is obligatory. But in either
case, there must be urgent necessity, and the right is exercised
only in time of war, though some writers admit that it can be ex-
ercised both in time of war and peace. Unfortunately, the term
"military neceasity" is rather ambiguous. It is often relied upon
too much by the belligerent, and especially is it most strongly
advocated by some of the German writers. Military necessity may
mean that which is absolutely necessary for the operation of war, or
it may mean that which has only economic value in the conduct of
war. It is of course up to the belligerent to decide the right of
requisition itself. But it does not infrequently happen that con-
cession is made to neutral interests on the ground of public policy
and convenience. But this limitation is essentially self-imposed.
As regards the present status of international law, there is
a good deal to be said with reference to the possibilities of its
development and amelioration. We have noticed that in land warfare,
while it has hitherto been the custom to lay hands on all the trans-
port within reach without drawing nice distinctions as to its
ownership, the practice is now surrounded with the closest restric-
tions. There is therefore little to be said for it in maritime
struggles where the difference between neutral and belligerent pro-
perty has always been sharply accentuated. But we can hardly deny
that the position of the neutral ship is always precarious and un-
pleasant, and the reason therefor is to be found in the entire
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system of the rules of maritime warfare which in some cases even
recognizes the possilDility of confiscation of private ships "being
determined "by reasons of expediency and politics, and not by mere
fairness, and in which the rights of private individuals are given
less consideration than they receive in the rules of warfare on
land. Therefore, if any improvement is made in regard to the re-
quisition of private neutral property, the prize law should neces-
sarily respect neutral property as much as in the warfare on land.
By far the most important of all is that a definite body of rules
regarding the exercise of the right should be drawn and enforced
effectively by an International Tribunal as comtemplated in the
League of Nations.
Indeed the right in question is from its very nature a danger-
ous measure. It should be exercised with the greatest caution, and
only under the pressure of national emergency. Phillimore says,
"It can only be excused and perhaps scarcely then justified by that
clear and overwhelming necessity which would compel an individual
to seize his neighbor's horse or weapon to defend his own life."^^
Lawrence says: "We may imagine how fiercely it might be resented, if
we contemplate for a moment what would be the consequences of, say,
the seizure by the United States Government of all the liners in the
port of New York in order to carry to its destination an expedition
against a central American Republic hastily planned in a sudden
emergency. Half the civilized world would suffer, and the other
half would make common cause with it."^^ In fact, the right most
vitally affects the political and commercial interests of neutrals.
It cuts the captain and crews from the vessel; it dispossesses the
neutral his property; it interrupts the regular course of business;
10. Phillimore, International Law, Vol.3, pp. 50-51
11. Lawrence, Principles of International Law, p. 627

and diverts the ordinary channels of commerce, and what is more
serious from a national standpoint is the fact that, it changes the
flag of the vessel, and forcibly withdraws it from the protection
and control of its own government. To assert this right is certain-
ly a legitimate though extreme exercise of the war power, if based
on the right of eminent domain, but its enforcement is almost
certain to occasion a feeling of resentment and humiliation on the
part of the weaker nations. There is all the greater reason on
this account that the right should be exercised with all due con-
sideration to the national pride and financial interests of neutral
states.
The End
•••«*•••»*«
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